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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Under any circumstances, does an indefinite term, at-will 
employee, who has no written or implied employment contract, have 
a right of action against his employer for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing upon being discharged? 
2. Assuming that an employer has a duty to exercise good 
faith in terminating its employees, did the district court err in 
failing to find that the evidence was insufficient to justify the 
jury's verdict that Nordstrom did not act in good faith in dis-
charging plaintiffs? 
3. Did the district court err in submitting to the jury the 
issue of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when plaintiffs stated no such claim for relief in any of 
their pleadings? 
4. Did the district court err in refusing to grant Nordstrom 
a new trial on the basis of: 
(a) Insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' claim; 
(b) Unfair surprise resulting from its submission to the 
jury the unpleaded claim of breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; 
(c) Failure to give any jury instructions concerning 
dismissal for cause; and 
(d) Failure to give jury instructions adequately defin-
ing good faith? 
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5. Should the district court's judgment be reversed and 
vacated or should a remittitur be granted on the basis of improper 
instructions concerning the measure of damages? 
6. Should Nordstrom be granted a remittitur or a new trial 
on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the jury's damage 
award? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Nordstrom believes the case of Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 
790 (Utah 1979), requires reversal of that portion of the district 
court's judgment which is in favor of plaintiffs and against 
Nordstrom and also of its order denying Nordstrom's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from that portion of the district court's judg-
ment favoring plaintiffs, and against Nordstrom. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In July 1982, plaintiffs commenced two separate actions, which 
were later consolidated for all purposes, stating tort claims for 
wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and defamation, and a contract claim for wrongful termination. R. 
C82-5860, 2-19 and 290-291; R. C82-5828, 2-9 and 290-291. Shortly 
after the cases were filed, the district court dismissed plain-
tiffs' tort claims for wrongful termination and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as failing to state claims upon 
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which relief could be granted. R. C82-5828, 103-104; R. C82-5860, 
112-113. 
Plaintiffs' remaining two claims for defamation and wrongful 
termination based on a breach of contract theory were tried to a 
jury on January 14-30, 1985. Nordstrom moved for directed verdict 
on those claims at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. Tr. Vol. 
V, 170. After all the evidence was in, the district court granted 
Nordstrom's motion in part, dismissing plaintiffs' defamation 
claims and finding plaintiffs had no employment contract upon 
which to base a wrongful termination claim.1 Tr. Vol. VIII, 
99-100. Despite its contract finding, the district court ruled 
that "there is a right of good faith dealing which is protected in 
the courts," and that, therefore, plaintiffs could recover if 
Nordstrom "violated that implied contract of good faith dealing" 
in terminating plaintiffs' employment. Tr. Vol. VIII, 101. 
Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury on the 
issue of whether Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs, 
awarding damages totaling $285,000.00. R. C82-5828, 538. Judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs on the jury's special verdict was 
entered on February 21, 1985. R. C82-5860, 491-493. The district 
court subsequently denied Nordstrom's motion for judgment 
The district court's judgment actually dismissed plaintiffs' 
wrongful termination claim, as well as their defamation 
claim. R. C82-5860, 491-493. The dismissal of those claims 
should have left nothing to go to the jury. 
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notwithstanding the verdict, new trial or remittitur. Order 
entered September 12, 1985, R. C82-5828, 2467-68. This appeal 
followed. Amended Notice of Appeal filed September 17, 1985, R. 
C82-5828, 2475-77. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nordstrom formerly employed plaintiffs Dennis Knapp, Barbara 
Knapp and Cathy Brehany at its Crossroads Plaza Store in Salt Lake 
City. Dennis Knapp was Nordstrom's first general manager .in 
Utah. Tr. Vol. I, 93, 116. He was responsible for opening the 
Salt Lake City store and staffing it with buyers and other man-
agers. Tr. Vol. I, 116-117. Prior to coming to Salt Lake, he 
managed a Nordstrom store in California. Tr. Vol. I, 93. Barbara 
Knapp and Cathy Brehany were both buyers in Nordstrom's Salt Lake 
City store. Tr. Vol. I, 120; Tr. Vol. II, 131-132; Tr. Vol. Ill, 
44-45. Nordstrom previously had employed both women in 
California. Tr. Vol. II, 123-124; Tr. Vol. Ill, 44. 
It is undisputed that Nordstrom employed all three plaintiffs 
for an indefinite term. R. C82-5828, 508. After being hired, 
plaintiffs each received a manual entitled Nordstrom History, 
Policy and Regulations. Tr. Vol. I, 79-80, Ex. P-l; Tr. Vol. II, 
123; Tr. Vol. Ill, 41-42. The manual provides that the following 
conduct may result in immediate dismissal: 
5. Unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or 
criticism upon the store and its personnel . . . . 
6. Entering or giving false testimony or informa-
tion on employment application . . . . 
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7. . . . [V]iolation of any criminal law . . . 
while in [Nordstrom's] employ. 
Ex. P-l. Each of the plaintiffs signed the following statement at 
the end of the manual: "I have read and understand the preceding 
pages of the Nordstrom policy and regulation manual. I understand 
that my continued employment is contingent upon my adhering to the 
policies stated therein." Tr. Vol. I, 80-81; Tr. Vol. Ill, 42; 
Tr. Vol. IX, 17. 
On July 20, 1981, Nordstrom terminated the employment of all 
three plaintiffs, as well as the employment of Michael Soule, who 
is not a party to this action. R. C82-5828, 3; R. C82-5860, 5, 
12-13. The events leading up to the terminations began with an 
internal investigation of drug-related activities involving 
Nordstrom employees in Southern California. During the course of 
the California investigation, Linda James, (Nordstrom*s Southern 
California security manager), reported to Bart Triesch 
(Nordstrom*s corporate security manager), that there were former 
California Nordstrom employees, then working for Nordstrom in 
Utah, who used drugs and had attended parties where drugs were 
used. Tr. Vol. IV, 106. 
Upon receiving that information, Triesch contacted two secur-
ity officers who had formerly worked in the Utah Division, Kathryn 
McMahon and Mary Tasa, asking if they had knowledge of drug use 
among Nordstrom employees in Utah. Tr. Vol. IV, 106. Both women 
gave Triesch oral, and later written, reports of such conduct. 
Tr. Vol. IV, 107-108, 113-114; Tr. Vol. V, 114, 117. 
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Mary Tasa reported to Triesch that Nordstrom employees had 
used drugs at a birthday party at Michael Soule's house, and that 
she had overheard a comment at a Christmas party at the Knapps' 
house indicating that marijuana was being smoked in the basement. 
Ex. D-27. Tasa also reported that Cathy Brehany had related to 
her that she occasionally "snorted" cocaine, but "didn't believe 
in coming to work high and particularly in not doing any drug-
related activities with co-workers outside of work." Ex. D-27. 
Kathryn McMahon told Triesch she had observed Nordstrom 
employees smoking marijuana at a birthday party for Michael 
Soule. Tr. Vol. IV, 107-108. McMahon also said Soule told her he 
had sent money to California to buy cocaine and many people 
working for Nordstrom were waiting for it. Tr. Vol. IV, 108. In 
addition, McMahon's written statement listed a number of Salt Lake 
City Nordstrom employees who used illegal drugs, including Dennis 
Knapp and Cathy Brehany.2 Ex. D-26. In her written statement, 
McMahon also reported that she saw Dennis Knapp smoke marijuana at 
Michael Soule's house. Ex. D-26. 
Triesch passed the information Tasa and McMahon gave him to 
his immediate supervisor, Gary Baughn. Tr. Vol. IV, 104, 112-113, 
In argument, plaintiffs' counsel questioned whether McMahon 
prepared her written statement, which was undated, prior to 
plaintiffs' terminations. Bart Triesch testified she did 
prepare the statement prior to the terminations. Tr., Vol. 
IV, 104. McMahon testified she wrote the statement "after 
people were already dismissed," but then added, "I don't know 
when they were fired." Tr., Vol. V, 117. From the evidence 
at trial, McMahon's statement could have been the only source 
of a list of names which plaintiffs' counsel argued was in the 
possession of Nordstrom management prior to the terminations. 
Tr. IX, 12-13, 23, 34. 
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118. Triesch and Baughn then discussed that information with John 
Nordstrom, Nordstrom"s co-chairman of the board. Tr. Vol. IV, 
113, 118, 156-157. 
In an effort to confirm the information in Tasa's and 
McMahon's reports, Mr. Nordstrom contacted Mary Kay Smithmeyer, a 
trusted employee who had worked in the Utah division. Tr. Vol. 
IV, 166, 211-212; Tr. Vol. VI, 42. Smithmeyer told Mr. Nordstrom 
she had been present at a picnic and at least two other parties at 
which Dennis Knapp and other Nordstrom employees were present 
where she smelled marijuana, and that Dennis Knapp was aware of 
what was going on at at least two of those occasions. Tr. Vol. 
IV, 167, 213-217; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54. She also reported having 
overheard a number of conversations in a stock room in the Salt 
Lake City store where people said that Cathy Brehany could get 
drugs. Tr. Vol. VI, 58. John Nordstrom testified that Smithmeyer 
told him Brehany "had a source for drugs." Tr. Vol. IV, 23-4. 
John Nordstrom also discussed the drug problem among Utah 
employees with Betsy Sanders, Nordstrom's general manager in 
Southern California. Tr. Vol. IV, 156, 196-197. Sanders 
confirmed that she had heard reports of Michael Soule transporting 
drugs to Nordstrom employees in Utah. Tr. Vol. V, 222. She told 
Mr. Nordstrom that Cathy Brehany had been a poor employee in 
California after being "tapped" to go to Utah, and that she had 
advised Dennis Knapp he should reconsider taking her to Utah. Tr. 
Vol. IV, 217, 228-229; Tr. Vol. V, 224-225. She also told 
Mr. Nordstrom that in California Cathy Brehany regularly 
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associated with persons who boasted about their drug involvement 
and, in particular, had "championed" one such individual after 
Nordstrom had fired him for stealing a customer's wallet. Tr. 
Vol. IV, 229; Tr. Vol. V, 222-224, 226. 
John Nordstrom discussed the information he received from 
Triesch, Smithmeyer and Sanders concerning employee drug involve-
ment in Utah with the company's executive committee, consisting of 
himself, James Nordstrom, Bruce Nordstrom, Robert Bender and Jack 
McMillan. Tr. Vol. IV, 165-166; Vol. V, 38. Based on that infor-
mation, together with James Nordstrom's report of similar informa-
tion he received from Betsy Sanders, the committee decided to ter-
minate the employment of the plaintiffs, Dennis Knapp, Barbara 
Knapp and Cathy Brehany, as well as the employment of Michael 
Soule. Tr. Vol. IV, 165-166, 177; Vol. V, 19, 31. Thereupon, on 
July 20, 1981, James Nordstrom and Robert Bender traveled to Salt 
Lake City and discharged plaintiffs and Soule. Tr. Vol. V, 26, 
29, 44, 47. 
Plaintiffs' admissions at trial supplemented, and in most 
respects confirmed, the information upon which the management com-
mittee acted. The evidence showed that Dennis Knapp's problems 
began from the day he started working with the company. He 
admitted signing his employment application, declaring it to be 
true and correct, even though the application stated he received 
an Honorable Discharge from the Air Force when in fact he had 
received an Undesirable Discharge. Tr. Vol. II, 23, 25; Ex. 
D-17. The application also stated he had never been "arrested" 
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when in fact, while in the Air Force, he had been charged with, 
and had pleaded guilty to, a criminal violation. Tr. Vol. II, 25; 
Ex. D-17. Dennis Knapp also admitted using marijuana and cocaine 
while employed by Nordstrom. Tr. Vol. I, 98-100; Tr. Vol. II, 
48-49. He specifically testified that he used marijuana and 
cocaine in the presence of vendors while representing Nordstrom on 
buying trips in San Diego, Seattle and New York. Tr. Vol. II, 
48-49. He admitted that Betsy Sanders confronted him about such 
drug use, and that he concealed the extent of his drug use from 
her. Tr. Vol. II, 44. He further admitted that, while he was 
general manager in Utah, he was aware of drug use by his employees 
and that several employees regularly used marijuana in his 
presence, but that he did nothing to discourage such use, even 
though he recognized it to be illegal. Tr. Vol. II, 32-35. There 
was also unrefuted testimony that Dennis Knapp lied about his 
wife's drug use to one of his employees, Nancy Love, even after 
his termination from Nordstrom. Tr. Vol. Ill, 109-110. 
Barbara Knapp admitted regularly using marijuana in Salt Lake 
City in the presence of other Nordstrom employees. Tr. Vol. Ill, 
83. She also admitted using marijuana while representing 
Nordstrom on buying trips in New York in the presence of vendors 
and other Nordstrom employees. Tr. Vol. Ill, 86, 88. 
Although Cathy Brehany repeatedly denied using or selling 
drugs herself, she admitted regularly associating with drug users 
and being with them while they used illegal drugs. Tr. Vol. II, 
139-140, 151; Vol. Ill, 6-9. Brehany admitted having offered to 
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introduce several of her friends, all Nordstrom employees, to Jody 
Bernafo, the owner of a bar in Park City where drugs were reported 
to be widely available, for the purpose of their obtaining cocaine 
from him. Tr. Vol. II, 140-141; Vol. Ill, 10-14. Two of the 
persons to whom she made this offer, Mary Tasa and Kathryn 
McMahon, were the very security officers who initially reported 
employee drug use in Salt Lake City to Bart Triesch. 
Despite the substantial evidence of plaintiffs' misconduct, 
their status as at-will employees, and the district court's dis-
missal of all their pleaded claims, the district court neverthe-
less submitted to the jury the claim that Nordstrom breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury 
returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor on that claim, awarding 
damages totaling $285,000. R. C82-5828, 538. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. This court should reverse and vacate that portion of the 
district court's judgment that is in favor of plaintiffs and 
against Nordstrom because: 
(a) In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that an indefinite-term employee has 
no right of action against his employer for breach of the employ-
ment contract upon being discharged. Hence, since plaintiffs were 
all indefinite term employees, it was error for the district court 
to submit to the jury the issue of whether Nordstrom breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in discharging 
them. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court should follow the large 
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majority of states who have rejected a bad faith exception to the 
at-will rule, based upon a variety of compelling considerations. 
Even those states that have recognized a bad faith exception, have 
done so under certain limited circumstances not present in this 
case. 
(b) The evidence was insufficient to justify the ver-
dict, since Nordstrom"s actions do not constitute bad faith under 
any court's ruling. 
(c) The issue of whether Nordstrom breached an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was neither raised in the 
pleadings nor tried, and therefore should not have been submitted 
to the jury. 
2. In the alternative, this court should reverse and grant 
Nordstrom a new trial because: 
(a) The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. 
(b) Submission of the issue of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing to the jury, which had not been 
pleaded nor tried, constituted unfair surprise to Nordstrom. 
(c) The district court failed to give any jury instruc-
tions concerning dismissal for cause, and there was substantial 
evidence of conduct justifying plaintiffs' terminations. 
(d) The district court failed to give jury instructions 
adequately defining the concept of "good faith.'1 
3. This court should reverse and vacate that portion of the 
district court's judgment favoring plaintiffs and against 
Nordstrom or order a remittitur of damages to $0.00 because the 
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district court, improperly instructed the jury concerning the 
measure of damages. Under the correct measure, plaintiffs are 
entitled to no damages. 
4. This court should order a remittitur or grant Nordstrom a 
new trial because, even if the district court's instruction con-
cerning the measure of damages is correct, the damages awarded by 
the jury are substantially in excess of any amount supported by 
the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND 
VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
JUDGMENT THAT IS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
AGAINST NORDSTROM. 
That portion of the district court's judgment favoring plain-
tiffs and against Nordstrom is in error and should be reversed and 
vacated for the following reasons: First, under established Utah 
law, since plaintiffs were indefinite-term, at-will employees, 
Nordstrom had the unfettered right to discharge them at any time 
for any reason. Second, even assuming that Utah law now recog-
nizes a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law 
to justify the jury's verdict. Third, a claim for relief for 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
neither pleaded nor tried, and could not properly be raised for 
the first time at the conclusion of the trial. 
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A. Plaintiffs Had No Right of Action Against Nordstrom Upon 
Being Discharged. 
1. Utah's at-will rule bars plaintiffs' wrongful 
termination claim. 
Even though plaintiffs' wrongful termination claim sounded in 
contract, plaintiffs nonetheless freely admitted at trial that 
they were employed by Nordstrom for an indefinite term. R. 
082-5828,508. The long-standing law in Utah concerning the con-
tract rights of an indefinite term employee upon being discharged 
was most recently stated in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 1979): 
The general rule concerning personal employment con-
tracts is, in the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment 
or of a good consideration in addition to the services 
contracted to be rendered, the contract is no more than 
an indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the 
will of either party. . . . 
When an individual is hired for an indefinite time 
he has no right of action against his employer for breach 
of the employment contract upon being discharged. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Accord e.g., Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978); 
Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 
211 (1957). 
In Bihlmaier, this court recognized only two situations in 
which the employer's right to discharge an employee may be 
limited: (1) where there is "some further express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of the employment" or (2) where 
there is "a good consideration in addition to the services con-
tracted to be rendered." Bihlmaier v. Carson, supra, 603 P.2d at 
792. Plaintiffs have never maintained that either situation is 
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present in this case. Hence, as the district court correctly 
stated with respect to plaintiffs' employment: "It's an employ-
ment at will." Tr. Vol. V, 192. Plaintiffs therefore had no 
right of action upon being discharged. 
Because the plaintiffs were at-will employees, the district 
court's submission to the jury of the issue of breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not just an 
extension of, but was contrary to, Utah law. Addressing the 
specific issue presented in the instant case, in accordance with 
Bihlmaier and other earlier decisions of the Utah Supreme court, 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah held 
that an at-will employee may not maintain a claim for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law 
upon being discharged. Heward v. Western Electric Co., Case No. 
C-81-0904W (D. Utah, Memorandum Decision and Order filed 
February 18, 1983), aff'd 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3423, 3425 (10th Cir. 
1984). Judge David K. Winder's Order in Heward states that such a 
claim is not "legally actionable, especially where the plaintiff's 
employment contract is indefinite as to duration and terminable at 
will." Id. 
More recently, in Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 
829 (D. Utah 1984), Judge Winder refused to allow a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on alleged religious discrimination, concluding 
that engrafting any exception on the traditional at-will rule 
would change Utah law: 
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[T]he long history of the Utah Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the terminable-at-will doctrine, the language the 
court has used in dismissing those cases and the failure 
of the court to even suggest that it might recognize an 
exception to that rule lead this court to the conclusion 
that the recognition of an exception to the terminable-
at-will would be a change in Utah law. [Citations 
omitted.] 
The district judge below also apparently recognized that 
allowing plaintiffs to maintain a claim for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing constituted a significant 
departure from established Utah law. He stated that doing so "may 
be stepping into a new era." Tr. Vol. VIII, 101. He further 
described his allowance of such a claim as a "new furrow . . . 
being drawn," and as a "new area in the law in this day. ..." 
Tr. Vol. VIII, 102, 103. 
Thus, in submitting the issue of whether Nordstrom breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the jury, and 
in denying Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the district court acted contrary to well-established 
Utah law. Under Utah law, the plaintiffs have no right of 
action. Accordingly, this court should reverse and vacate the 
district court's judgment. 
2. A claim for bad faith termination of an employment 
relationship should not be allowed in this case. 
a. The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a claim 
for bad faith termination of employment. 
Prior to Bihlmaier, this court considered whether a claim for 
bad faith termination of an insurance agent was actionable in Mann 
v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). In 
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Mann, the plaintiff, an insurance agent, brought an action for 
damages against his employer for wrongful termination of his 
agency contract. The plaintiff in Mann argued that even though a 
party might have a right to terminate a contract without cause, he 
must nevertheless exercise the right in good faith. The Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating: 
Whatever the justification for judicial remaking of 
the party's contracts in these extreme cases may have 
been, it cannot be adopted as a general precept of con-
tract law that, whenever one party to a contract can show 
injury flowing from the exercise of a contract right by 
the other, a basis for relief will somehow be devised by 
the courts. 
Id. at 464. The court added: 
This court has previously demonstrated strong reluc-
tance to rewrite contracts for litigants because the con-
sequences of enforcement of the contracts they signed 
seemed unfair. 
Id. The court then held it was unnecessary to decide in the con-
text of that case whether exercise of a contract right in bad 
faith is t>r is not actionable, since in that case there was insuf-
ficient evidence of bad faith to go to the jury, where the plain-
tiff's evidence of bad faith "consistted] entirely of evidence of 
his satisfactory performance and the lack of good cause for ter-
mination." J^ d. 
Other than Mann, we are aware of no case in which the Utah 
Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of the actionabil-
ity of a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith. 
However, the sweeping language of Bihlmaier, that an indefinite-
term employee has no right of action upon being discharged, neces-
sarily precludes such a claim. As shown above, the United States 
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District Court in Heward v. Western Electric Co., supra. Case No. 
C-81-0904W (D. Utah, Memorandum Decision and Order filed 
February 18, 1983), specifically held that such a claim is barred 
by Utah's at-will rule. 
b. A majority of states have rejected a bad faith 
exception to the at-will rule. 
While the courts of a few states have created an exception to 
the at-will rule by allowing recovery for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under certain limited cir-
cumstances (none of which, as shown below, are present in this 
case), a decided majority of states still have categorically 
refused to do so. New York recently rejected a claim for breach 
of an implied covenant of good faith in Murphy v. American Home 
Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 
(1983). There, the court noted that in appropriate circumstances, 
an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a 
party to a contract may be implied and, if implied, will be 
enforced. As the court observed, however, "in such instances the 
implied obligation is in aid and furtherance of other terms of the 
agreement of the parties." _Id. The court then refused to impose 
such an obligation with respect to the right to terminate an 
at-will employment relationship, stating: 
No obligation can be implied, however, which would 
be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual 
relationship. Thus, in the case now before us, plain-
tiff's employment was at will, a relationship in which 
the law accords the employer an unfettered right to ter-
minate the employment at any time. In the context of 
such an employment it would be incongruous to say that an 
inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed 
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to a position which would be destructive of his right of 
termination. The parties may by express agreement limit 
or restrict the employer's right of discharge, but to 
imply such a limitation from the existence of an 
unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent. 
Id. at 237. 
Based on similar reasoning, the Arizona Supreme Court, in 
Waqenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166 
(Ariz. 1985), also recently refused to impose any good faith 
limitation on the employer's right to terminate an at-will 
employee: 
[T]he implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing projects [sic] the right of the parties to an 
agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement that 
they have entered into. The denial of a party's right to 
those benefits, whatever they are, will breach the duty 
of good faith implicit in the contract. Thus, the rele-
vant inquiry always will focus on the contract itself to 
determine what the parties did agree to. In the case of 
an employment-at-will contract, it may be said that the 
parties have agreed, for example, that the employee will 
do the work required by the employer and that the 
employer will provide the necessary working conditions 
and pay the employee for work done. What cannot be said 
is that one of the agreed benefits to the at-will 
employee is a guarantee of continued employment or 
tenure. The very nature of the at-will agreement pre-
cludes any claim for a prospective benefit. Either 
employer or employee may terminate the contract at any 
time. 
Id. at 3177-78. 
Likewise, in Ericksen v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., 119 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3621 (N.D. 111. 1984), the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Illinois 
law, dismissed the claim of an at-will employee for wrongful 
termination based on the alleged breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith, stating that the good faith obligation "does not 
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create an independent cause of action." Ld. at 3623. The court 
added: 
The principle of good faith comes into play in defining 
and modifying duties which grow out of specific contract 
terms and obligations. It is a derivative principle." 
Since no specific contractual obligation is alleged here, 
the good faith principle does not come into play as a 
cause of action. 
Id. [Citations omitted.] 
In another recent case relied on heavily by plaintiffs in 
their argument against Nordstrom's motion for directed verdict, 
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 
(1984), the Washington Supreme Court also refused to create a bad 
faith exception to the at-will doctrine, stating: 
We do not adopt [the bad faith] exception. An 
employer's interest in running his business as he sees 
fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee 
in maintaining his employment and this exception does not 
strike the proper balance. We believe that 
To imply into each employment contract a duty 
to terminate in good faith would . . . subject each 
discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous 
concept of bad faith. . . . 
Moreover, while an employer may agree to restrict or 
limit his right to discharge an employee, to imply such a 
lestriction on that right from the existence of a con-
tractual right, which, by its terms has no restrictions, 
is internally inconsistent. Such an intrusion into the 
employment relationship is merely a judicial substitute 
for collective bargaining which is more appropriately 
left to the legislative process. 
685 P.2d at 1086-87. [Citations omitted.] 
Many other courts have reached the same conclusion. The 
Florida District Court of Appeal, in Muller v. Stromberq Carlson 
Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. App. 1983), refused to adopt a bad 
faith exception to the at-will rule. Although it had previously 
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acknowledged an obligation of good faith with respect to termina-
tion of a definite term contract, the court observed that the 
obligation of good faith could not be deemed to create a contract 
for a definite term, and therefore did not apply in an at-will 
contract. 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a bad faith exception to 
the at-will doctrine, stating: 
We are not persuaded that protection of employees 
requires such an intrusion on the employment relationship 
or such an imposition on the courts. 
Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 374, 652 P.2d 
625, 629 (1982). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also held that employment con-
tracts contain no implied duty to terminate only in good faith, 
stating that it was, 
unnecessary and unwarranted for courts to become arbiters 
of any termination that may have a tinge of bad faith 
attached. Imposing a good faith duty to terminate would 
unduly restrict an employer's discretion in managing the 
work force. 
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 564, 335 N.W.2d 
834, 838 (1983). 
An earlier Arizona case reaffirming the at-will doctrine, and 
refusing to recognize a bad faith exception, noted that, "[t]he 
effect of adhering to such a rule [allowing a bad faith exception] 
would be to expose an employer to a lawsuit every time he dis-
charges an employee with a contract terminable at will." Daniel 
v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 324, 620 P.2d 699, 703 (1980). 
In sum, a majority of courts have rejected a bad faith excep-
tion to the at-will rule for a number of reasons, including: 
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(1) Reluctance to rewrite contracts or to create a judicial 
substitute for the collective bargaining process; 
(2) The inconsistency inherent in imposing a contract term by 
implication that is contrary to the unfettered contract right to 
terminate permitted by the at-will doctrine; 
(3) The fact that the good faith duty cannot create an 
independent cause of action, but must be in aid of some specific 
contract term which does not exist in an indefinite term employ-
ment where neither employer nor employee makes any promise of 
future performance; 
(4) The necessarily amorphous nature of a good faith standard 
and the resulting difficulty in its application; 
(5) The undue restraint necessarily imposed by such a 
requirement on the employer's discretion in managing his work 
force; and 
(6) The likelihood that such a rule would expose the employer 
to a lawsuit every time he discharges an employee with a contract 
terminable at will. 
All of these reasons are sound and should be given controlling 
weight by this court. 
c. Those states that have recognized a bad faith excep-
tion have done so under circumstances not present in 
the instant case. 
In general, the few states that have recognized a bad faith 
exception have done so under circumstances not present in the 
instant case. The positions of the few states which created the 
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exception, and^  which were relied on by plaintiffs below, may be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) New Hampshire. The bad faith exception applies "only in 
a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed 
an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that 
which public policy would condemn." Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co.. 
120 N.H. 295. 414 A.2d 1273. 1294 (1980). limiting the holding of 
the seminal case Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.. 114 N.H. 130. 316 A.2d 
549 (1974). 
(2) Massachusetts. The employee's right to make a claim for 
lack of good faith arises where the employer intends to benefit 
financially at the employee's expense, or the employer's reason 
for the discharge was contrary to public policy. Siles v. 
Travenol Laboratories. Inc.. 13 Mass. App. 354. 433 N.E.2d 103 
(1982). explaining Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.. 373 
Mass. 96. 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977). 
(3) California. 
California courts have repeatedly considered situa-
tions where violation of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing has been alleged as a result of a 
"termination without good cause." The courts have 
refused to recognize any such cause of action based on 
that naked covenant alone. As indicated above, the 
rulings of those courts were always predicated upon other 
public policy grounds, statutory violation, or express 
(or clearly implied) contract grounds, or upon a combina-
tion of elements (e.g. especially longevity of service 
together with some added element (Cleary) 18 years and 
company policies; (Pugh) 32 years and company policies, 
faithful service and lack of criticism). [Emphasis in 
original.] 
Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 448, 
203 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1984), referring to Cleary v. American 
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Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1980) 
and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 917 (1981). 
None of the circumstances which gave rise to the bad faith 
exception exists in the instant case. As explained in more detail 
below, there was no evidence whatever that plaintiffs' termina-
tions violated any public policy, that Nordstrom intended to 
benefit financially from plaintiffs* discharges, or that Nordstrom 
violated any statute, contract or company policy in discharging 
plaintiffs. Therefore, none of the circumstances exist in the 
instant case that would justify application of the bad-faith 
exception, even in the states that have made the most significant 
departures from the traditional at-will rule. 
d. This court should reject the bad faith exception. 
This court should follow the majority of courts in this 
country and reject a bad-faith exception to the at-will rule. 
Those courts, as outlined above, have presented many sound reasons 
for refusing to do so. Even those courts which have recognized 
such a claim have not done so under the circumstances of the 
instant case. 
The instant case is a compelling illustration of the problems 
inherent in creating a claim for breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiffs, as the district 
court ruled, were indefinite term, at-will employees. Nordstrom 
violated no public policy, statute or contract term in discharging 
them and had no financial motive for their terminations. Rather, 
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as described in the Statement of Facts above, prior to discharging 
plaintiffs, Nordstrom's top management had personally undertaken 
an investigation of plaintiffs' conduct and confirmed by indepen-
dent witnesses the existence of facts which they believed necessi-
tated plaintiffs' terminations. Nordstrom's efforts to eradicate 
a serious drug problem in its work force should have been 
applauded; instead it was slapped with a $285,000 verdict against 
it. 
If this court affirms the jury's verdict and adopts the good 
faith requirement as the law of this state, it will place 
employers in the untenable position of justifiably fearing similar 
results when taking employment actions believed necessary to cor-
rect serious employment problems. The court should not allow this 
result. The holding of the district court should be reversed and 
plaintiffs' claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing be dismissed as failing to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under Utah law. 
3. Any change in the at-will rule should be made by the 
legislature. 
As many courts have recognized, if the at-will rule is to be 
changed, the legislature, not the courts, is best suited to eval-
uate the impact of such a change, discern the public will, and 
make that determination. See, e.g., Ising v. Barnes Hospital, 674 
S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Mo. App. 1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper 
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Murphy v. American 
Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 
-24-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1983); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 
177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983); Poirier v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 116 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086, 2089 (Me. Super. Ct. 1983). The at-will rule 
has long governed most employer-employee relationships. Over the 
years both employers and employees undoubtedly have made countless 
employment decisions in reliance on the rule, whose meaning, until 
now, has been clear. Thus, changing the rule would unquestionably 
have far-reaching, unforeseeable consequences. As one court 
argued, the legislature has greater resources and procedural means 
than the courts to, among other things, investigate and anticipate 
the impact of imposing new liability; establish standards appli-
cable to the multifarious types of employment and various circum-
stances of discharge; and implement a change in the rights and 
obligations forged in reliance on the rule so as to best accommo-
date competing interests, perhaps by making the changes prospec-
tive only. Murphy v. American Home Products, supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d 
at 235-36. 
The Utah legislature has considered the employment relation-
ship and has seen fit to prohibit the denial of employment oppor-
tunities only under certain limited circumstances. The Anti-
Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended), prohibits employment decisions made on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, age, national origin or 
handicap. Utah Code Ann. § 34-37-16 (1953 as amended) forbids 
employers to deny or terminate employment because of refusal to 
submit to polygraph examination. Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-8 (1953 
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as amended) prohibits certain unfair employment practices by 
employers and labor unions. Significantly, although the Utah 
legislature has concerned itself with the rights of employees, no 
legislation has altered the traditional at-will rule in any way, 
except as may result under the above situations involving viola-
tions of important public policies. 
In sum, the district court's submission to the jury of a claim 
based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
contrary to well-established Utah law. To affirm the district 
court's decision, this court must overrule Bihlmaier. So doing 
would transform law that is certain and clear into law that will 
be fraught with uncertainty and, consequently, destined to launch 
a wave of litigation and to have other far-reaching and unforesee-
able effects. This court should defer to the legislature, which 
has the best vantage point from which to make such sweeping 
changes in the law, and should reverse the district court. 
B. Even if this Court Recognizes the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, as a Matter of Law there is 
Insufficient Evidence to Justify the Jury's Verdict. 
Utah case law defines "bad faith" as "a thing done dishonestly 
and not merely negligently . . . [and] as that which imports a 
dishonest purpose and implies wrongdoing for some motive of self-
interest." Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1984), citing Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions 
First National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869, 870 (1968). As 
discussed above, other cases hold that bad faith may exist where 
an employer discharges an employee in violation of public policy, 
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statute or contract or where there is an improper financial motive 
for the discharge. On the other hand, in Mann v. American Western 
Life Insurance Co., supra, 568 P.2d at 461, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that bad faith does not exist where the sole evidence of bad 
faith is that an employee has performed satisfactorily for an 
extended period of time, and there is no good cause for termina-
tion. 
Under these definitions of bad faith, viewing the facts most 
favorably to plaintiffs, as a matter of law the evidence does not 
support a finding that Nordstrom acted in bad faith. There was no 
suggestion at trial that Nordstrom acted out of a dishonest 
purpose or had some motive of self-interest. There also was no 
evidence of a violation of public policy, contract or statute or 
of an improper financial motive, or breach of public policy. 
Rather than relying on any of these grounds, at closing argu-
ment, plaintiffs' counsel argued that Nordstrom acted in bad faith 
primarily on the basis that Nordstrom's investigation was unsatis-
factory. Plaintiffs' counsel also argued that the terminations 
were in bad faith because plaintiffs had performed well in their 
jobs for a substantial period of time and other employees reported 
as drug users were not fired. With respect to Barbara Knapp, 
counsel argued that her termination was in bad faith based on Jim 
Nordstrom's testimony that she was discharged because she was 
Dennis' wife and a management-level employee, and he thought it 
would be a problem for the Utah division if she remained. 
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None of plaintiffs1 arguments supports a finding of bad 
faith. Even assuming there is a factual basis for the arguments, 
the conduct complained of simply has never been held to give rise 
to liability for bad faith. With respect to the quality of 
Nordstrom*s investigation, plaintiffs' complaints are baseless in 
the first instance because the law does not require any investiga-
tion prior to termination. All that is required is an honest pur-
pose and a reasonable belief that sufficient cause for discharge 
existed. Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, supra, 690 P.2d 
at 1132; Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 
1276 (1982). Indeed, public policy should allow an employer to 
take action with respect to its work force without being required 
to engage in police work. See, Buckmon v. Wilmington Dry Goods, 
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3156 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
In any case, the facts in the instant case establish that 
Nordstrom undertook reasonable efforts to confirm the existence of 
a drug problem among its Utah employees which justified the action 
taken. Nordstrom management received four independent and cor-
roborative witness statements regarding Cathy Brehany's drug 
involvement: the oral or written statements of Kathryn McMahon, 
Mary Tasa, Mary Kay Smithmeyer and Betsy Sanders. Tr. Vol. IV, 
111, 117, 234; Tr. Vol. V, 222-223; Tr. Vol. VI, 58; Ex. D-26 and 
D-27. Moreover, the three witnesses who had been in Utah, Mary 
Kay Smithmeyer, Kathryn McMahon and Mary Tasa, all confirmed 
Dennis Knapp's knowledge of employee drug activities and his 
failure to take any steps to deal with the problem. Tr. Vol. IV, 
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111-112, 167, 213-217; Tr. Vol. V, 114-115; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54; 
Ex. D-26 and D-27. Given Dennis Knapps' position, it was 
reasonable to believe that his wife's remaining could cause 
problems in the Utah division. In short, Nordstrom management 
received substantial cumulative information which justified their 
reasonable belief that sufficient cause for plaintiffs' 
termination existed. 
Plaintiffs' next argument was that Nordstrom acted in bad 
faith because they were good employees who satisfactorily per-
formed their duties, and were terminated without cause. Even if 
true, the Utah Supreme Court held in Mann that such evidence does 
not constitute "bad faith." 586 P.2d at 461. And in fact, even 
though plaintiffs had in many respects satisfactorily performed 
their duties, there was, as shown in the Statement of Facts and 
the discussion below, cause for termination in accordance with the 
Nordstrom policy manual. 
Plaintiffs' argument that Nordstrom acted "unfairly" in ter-
minating the plaintiffs' employment while other employees using 
drugs remained with the company also provides no basis for a find-
ing of bad faith. Aside from the fact that the argument inappro-
priately focused the jury on a lay concept of "fairness" rather 
the district court's instructions defining "bad faith," the argu-
ment improperly called upon the jury to substitute its judgment 
for that of management in deciding whether proper actions were 
taken to correct a difficult, and potentially devastating situa-
tion within the company. See, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., supra, 
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116 C.A. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981) ("Care must be 
taken not to interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial 
discretion.") 
Even if, as plaintiffs' counsel argued, management selected 
four people to discharge as examples to others, the freedom to do 
so should be within their discretion. Law enforcement officials 
have the discretion to grant immunity to some in order to obtain 
testimony to convict others. The law is clear, even in states 
most favorable to employees, that in making decisions concerning 
termination of an employee, the employer must be allowed substan-
tial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment, especially 
where the employee occupies a sensitive managerial position, as 
did plaintiffs. Id. That discretion must extend to the decision 
of which employees, if any, to terminate. 
Plaintiffs' argument rests on a shaky factual footing in any 
case. While plaintiffs were able to troop their friends to the 
witness stand at trial to regale the jury with tales of widespread 
drug use among Nordstrom employees, there was little, if any, evi-
dence that such information was available to top Nordstrom manage-
ment at the time of plaintiffs' terminations. As shown in the 
Statement of Facts, there was evidence that Nordstrom management 
in Seattle received repeated reports of general employee drug use 
of which Dennis Knapp was aware and uniform reports of Michael 
Soule's and Cathy Brehany's drug involvement. Concerning the 
specific involvement of other employees, there was far less infor-
mation. 
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The reason for the relative dearth of information concerning 
the conduct of other specific employees is obvious: drug use is 
illegal and effort was made to cover it up. One of plaintiffs' 
friends, Steve Heck, after blithely testifying of his drug 
involvement and that of other Nordstrom employees, admitted that 
such conduct was kept "hush, hush." Tr. Vol. Ill, 158. Dennis 
Knapp did not even deny Nancy Love's testimony that he lied to her 
about his wife Barbara's drug use even after they were 
discharged. Tr. Vol. Ill, 109-110. 
In any case, so long as Nordstrom acted out of honest motives 
and reasonable belief, it did not act in bad faith. There was no 
evidence whatever that Nordstrom acted for any purpose other than 
to correct what it perceived to be a serious problem among its 
employees. Even dismissing Barbara Knapp because she was Dennis' 
wife was within the proper bounds of management discretion due to 
the likelihood of serious morale problems among employees if she 
remained. (As shown below, there was good cause for her dismissal 
in any event.) 
Thus, none of the facts recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
or other courts as establishing bad faith are present in this 
case. Plaintiffs' inappropriate and repeated emphasis on "fair-
ness" in closing argument served merely to confuse the jurors and 
to encourage them to substitute their judgment for that of 
Nordstrom management in evaluating whether the terminations were 
"fair." Because the evidence was insufficient to establish bad 
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faith as defined by Utah law, the district court erred in denying 
Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
its judgment against Nordstrom should be reversed. 
C. The Judgment Should be Reversed Since it Grants Relief on 
an Issue that was Neither Raised in the Pleadings nor 
Specifically Tried. 
At the time this case went to trial, two pleaded claims for 
relief remained: a defamation claim and a claim for wrongful ter-
mination based on contract. The trial court's judgment dismissed 
both claims. Hence, in submitting to the jury the issue of 
whether Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, the court presented to the jury an issue that was 
neither raised in the pleadings nor specifically tried. 
This court has recently stated the following with regard to 
the grant of relief on matters outside the pleadings: 
It is a rule of longstanding that every final judg-
ment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. However, 
findings which are at variance with the claims of both 
parties are not favored and are carefully scrutinized on 
review. Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on grounds 
not pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize 
the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried. 
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 
1984). 
In this case, as part of their breach of contract claim, 
plaintiffs alleged that Nordstrom breached a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in that there was no good cause for plain-
tiffs' discharge. Plaintiff Brehany in her Amended Complaint 
alleges: 
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The defendant corporation by and through its officers or 
agents breached its duty of good faith in that the Plain-
tiff was wrongfully discharged even though she had not 
violated any policy or regulation contained within the 
written provisions of the "History, Policy & Regulations" 
pamphlet published by the Defendant Corporation to the 
employees of the Defendants' far flung operations in 
Utah, Washington, Oregon, California and Hawaii. 
R. C82-5828, 108. In their Complaint, the Knapps make substan-
tially the same allegation. R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12. 
In accordance with the issue framed by plaintiffs in their 
pleadings, Nordstrom requested jury instructions which would have 
required the jury to determine whether in fact plaintiffs violated 
the rules of the Nordstrom policy manual, and therefore were prop-
erly discharged for cause. R. C82-5828, 642-643. The court 
declined to give such instructions, but rather submitted instruc-
tions to the jury requiring the jury to analyze the motives and 
beliefs of Nordstrom management — a wholly different issue than 
the good faith issue raised in the pleadings. 
Indeed, at the time the district court ordered that the issue 
of breach of an implied covenant and fair dealing go to the jury, 
neither plaintiffs nor defendants had submitted any instructions 
specifically addressing that issue. The court had to recess until 
the following morning to allow the parties to prepare instruc-
tions. Tr. Vol. VIII, 105-107. The next morning, Norsdstrom sub-
mitted instructions pursuant to the court's order, R. C82-5828, 
579-595, but objected to giving any such instructions as being 
contrary to law and as addressing an issue that was never 
pleaded. R. C82-5828, 580; Tr. Vol. IX, 89, 91. Plaintiffs at no 
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time requested.any instructions even remotely resembling those 
finally given to the jury. 
Based on the pleadings, Nordstrom, at trial, focused its pre-
sentation on plaintiff's conduct and therefore, for example, 
elected not to bring James and John Nordstrom from Seattle to Salt 
Lake City to testify after plaintiffs read their depositions to 
the jury. When the case was submitted to the jury, however, for 
the first time the conduct of Nordstrom management, and not that 
of plaintiffs, was put in issue, thereby effectively denying 
Nordstrom its right to trial by jury by denying it the opportunity 
to present its case with knowledge of the claims against it. In 
so doing, the trial court improperly submitted to the jury an 
issue neither raised in the pleadings nor tried. Accordingly, the 
jury's verdict and the judgment entered thereon should be set 
aside by this court. 
POINT II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD REVERSE AND GRANT NORDSTROM A NEW TRIAL. 
In the alternative, Nordstrom urges that if this court does 
not reverse the district court for its denial of Nordstrom's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, then the court 
should at least reverse the district court for its error in deny-
ing Nordstrom's motion for a new trial. The appropriate grounds 
for granting a new trial are set forth in Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and include, among others, the following: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
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abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
* * * 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
* * * 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Nordstrom is entitled to a new trial in this case based on 
each of the above grounds. 
A. Nordstrom is Entitled to a New Trial Because There is 
Insufficient Evidence to Justify the Verdict. 
The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion 
for a new trial as follows: 
Where the trial court has denied the motion for new 
trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there 
was "an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision ..." 
The trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will 
be reversed only if "the evidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
[Emphasis in original.] 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (1982), quoting McCloud v. 
Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). A verdict may be set aside 
as contrary to the preponderance of the evidence although directed 
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not justified. 
McCloud v. Baum, supra, 569 P.2d at 1127 n. 1. 
For the reasons discussed at length above, there is insuffi-
cient evidence to justify a verdict that Nordstrom acted in "bad 
faith" as that concept is defined by Utah law. In fact, the evi-
dence in this case demonstrates that the jury reached a verdict 
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which is unreasonable and unjust. Accordingly, the district court 
committed reversible error in denying Nordstrom's motion for new 
trial on this ground. 
B. Submitting the Issue of Breach of an Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing to the Jury Constituted 
Unfair Surprise to Nordstrom. 
As discussed above, the issue of breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing was neither raised in the pleadings 
nor tried. The trial court's submission of the issue to the jury, 
if not grounds for reversing the trial court's denial of 
Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, at 
least constituted an irregularity in the proceedings or a surprise 
within the meaning of Rule 59. As a result, Nordstrom is entitled 
to a new trial in which the issue of good faith can be properly 
developed and decided. 
C. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Instruct the Jury 
on Dismissal for Cause. 
Nordstrom requested that the district court instruct the jury 
concerning dismissal for cause. R. C82-5828, 642-643. Nordstrom 
also submitted a proposed special verdict form which would have 
required the jury to determine whether Nordstrom discharged plain-
tiffs without good cause. R. C82-5828, 570-571. Over Nordstrom's 
objection, the district court refused to give Nordstrom's 
requested instructions or to submit the issue of dismissal for 
cause to the jury by special verdict. Tr. Vol. IX, 90. Specifi-
cally, the district court refused to instruct the jury that plain-
tiffs' terminations were not actionable if made for offenses 
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listed as grounds for immediate termination in Nordstrom History, 
Policy and Regulation manual, or for other good cause. 
Nordstrom's Requested Instruction No. 34, R. C82-5828, 642. The 
district court also failed to instruct the jury that Nordstrom, in 
justifying its dismissal of plaintiffs, could rely on grounds 
other than those stated at the time of the terminations even if 
Nordstrom was unaware of those grounds at that time. Nordstrom's 
Requested Instruction No. 35, R. C82-5828, 643. 
Both instructions are based not only on well-established law, 
but track the claims of the Knapps' Complaint and Brehany's 
Amended Complaint, both of which complain that plaintiffs were 
discharged without having committed any violations of the 
Nordstrom policy manual. R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12; R. C82-5828, 5-6, 
108. Even the California courts which have created the broadest 
exceptions to the at-will rule recognize that a termination is not 
actionable if good cause exists. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 
Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American 
Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1980). 
Similarly, it is firmly established that an employer's dis-
missal of an employee is justified if a sufficient ground for dis-
missal existed at the time of the discharge, regardless of whether 
the employer knew of the ground or not, or whether he had assigned 
some other ground as the cause for the dismissal. Laney v. Oregon 
Nurses Assoc., 53 Or. App. 422, 424, 632 P.2d 472, 474-475 (1981); 
Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th 
Cir. 1954); Marnon v. Vaughn Motor Co., 189 Or. 339, 219 P.2d 163 
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(1950); Haaq v. Revel1, 28 Wash. 2d 883, 184 P.2d 442, 445 (1947); 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 237, Illustration 8 at 219 
(1981). 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 46 at 120-121 
(1970). 
Both of these instructions were critical in the present case 
because the evidence at trial established that plaintiffs had com-
mitted violations of the Nordstrom History, Policy and Regulation, 
which justified plaintiffs' dismissal. The manual provides that 
an employee may be subject to immediate dismissal if he is, among 
other offenses, guilty of (1) providing false information on an 
employment application, (2) committing violations of criminal law, 
or (3) engaging in "unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or 
criticism upon the store." Ex. D-l. 
All three plaintiffs were guilty of such conduct. Dennis 
Knapp admitted supplying false information on his employment 
application, and using illegal drugs while in Nordstrom's employ, 
including use of marijuana and cocaine in the presence of vendors 
on buying trips in San Diego, Seattle and New York. Tr. Vol. II, 
48-50. He also admitted that Nordstrom employees regularly used 
illegal drugs in his presence, including in his home, while he was 
general manager in Utah, but that he did nothing to discourage 
such use, even though he recognized it to be illegal. Tr. Vol. 
II, 32-35. Barbara Knapp also admitted to routine illegal drug 
use, in Salt Lake City in the presence of other Nordstrom employ-
ees and on buying trips to New York in the presence of venders. 
Tr. Vol. Ill, 83, 86, 88. Cathy Brehany admitted regularly being 
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in the presence of friends while they used illegal drugs and mak-
ing introductions for her friends for the purpose of their 
obtaining cocaine, which conduct, at a minimum, should be viewed 
as "unbecoming." Tr. Vol. II, 139-140, 151; Vol. Ill, 6-14. 
This evidence of plaintiffs' violations of the manual justi-
fied submission of the issue of dismissal for cause to the jury. 
Both the plaintiffs' complaints, as well as their proposed jury 
instructions, recognized that an employer can discharge an 
employee for just and sufficient cause. R. C82-5828, 699. The 
district court's refusal to instruct the jury concerning dismissal 
for cause in accordance with Nordstrom's proposed instructions was 
reversible error. 
D. The District Court Erred in Failing to Adequately Define 
the Concept of Good Faith. 
Over Nordstrom's objection, the district court failed to give 
Nordstrom's Requested Instruction Nos. 64 and 66, which define the 
concept of good faith. Tr. Vol. IX, 91. Those instructions were 
essential to a proper determination of whether Nordstrom acted in 
good faith. Instruction No. 64 stated that Nordstrom acted in 
good faith in discharging plaintiffs if it acted on the honest 
belief, even if mistaken, that plaintiffs' discharge was required 
for legitimate business interests. R. C82-5828, 588. It is 
well-established that an employer acts in good faith in discharg-
ing an employee if an employer's decision is based on reasons the 
employer reasonably believes to be true, even if the employer is 
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actually mistaken. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 
643 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (1982). 
Instruction No. 66 stated that in determining whether 
Nordstrom acted in good faith in discharging plaintiffs, the jury 
should exercise care so as not to interfere with the legitimate 
exercise in managerial discretion by Nordstrom, and where, as in 
this case, the employees occupied sensitive managerial positions, 
Nordstrom must of necessity be allowed substantial scope of the 
exercise of its subjective judgment. R. C82-5828, 590. This 
instruction is quoted directly from a decision which recognizes 
broad exceptions to the at-will rule, but which at the same time 
recognizes an employer's legitimately broad and subjective pre-
rogatives in dealing with high-level management employees such as 
plaintiffs. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981). 
The district court's failure to submit the foregoing instruc-
tions to the jury is reversible error. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, AND 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S AWARD. 
A. The District Court Improperly Instructed the Jury 
Regarding the Measure of Damages. Under the Proper 
Measure, Plaintiffs are Entitled to No Damages. 
Therefore, this Court Should Reverse and Vacate That 
Portion of the District Court's Judgment Favoring 
Plaintiffs or Order a Remittitur of Damages to $0.00. 
The district court ruled on Nordstrom's motion for directed 
verdict at the conclusion of the trial. Tr. Vol. VIII, 99-107. 
At that time, the court ruled that the jury should decide whether 
Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and that lost wages could not be the measure of damages 
for such a breach. Tr. Vol. VIII, 100-101, 104-105. The court 
ordered that counsel prepare jury instructions accordingly. 
Tr. Vol. VIII, 105-107. Notwithstanding the court's ruling, the 
following day plaintiffs proposed an instruction which required 
the jury to compute damages on the basis of lost wages. 
R. C-82-5828, 802. The court adopted that instruction as its 
Instruction No. 18. R. C-82-5828, 557. Nordstrom objected to the 
instruction. Tr. Vol. IX, 89-90. 
Instruction No. 18 was contrary to the court's own ruling, and 
contrary to law. As at-will employees, plaintiffs had no right to 
future employment. Therefore, the district court's initial ruling 
was correct and in harmony with the majority of courts which have 
held that an employee for an indefinite term who is wrongfully 
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discharged may not recover damages for lost future salary or bene-
fits. Jeter v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 791, 792 
(W.D. Okla. 1976); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 
Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982). Where an employee is hired for 
an indefinite term, there is no way to ascertain how long the 
employee would have retained the job had the breach not occurred, 
and, therefore, there is no way to determine loss of earnings. 
Freeman v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co., 239 F. Supp. 
661, 662 (W.D. Okla. 1965). 
If plaintiffs had had contracts for a definite term, their 
damages would have been limited to wages lost only for the 
unexpired term of their contracts. See, e.g., Chapin v. Klein, 
128 Ariz. 94, 623 P.2d 1250 (1981). Where plaintiffs had no 
agreement of employment for any term, and the duration of their 
employment was entirely speculative, it was patently unfair for 
them to have been allowed to recover damages for lost wages beyond 
what they might have recovered had they bargained for and obtained 
a definite term contract. 
Even in Massachusetts, one of the few jurisdictions that has 
i 
allowed any recovery for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing on termination of an at-will employee, the 
courts have held that damages for such a breach may not include 
compensation for future services. McCone v. New England Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., 393 Mass. 231, 471 N.E.2d 47 (1984). In 
McCone, the court described recoverable damages as follows: 
In awarding damages for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, n[o]ur goal is and has been 
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simply to deny to [the employer] any readily definable, 
financial windfall resulting from the denial to [the 
employee] of compensation for past services." 
Id. at 2408. This measure of damages is consistent with the 
at-will employee's status, but at the same time denies the 
employer any financial windfall from a discharge. 
Denial of damages for lost wages in the instant case also con-
forms with the written salary arrangements Nordstrom provided each 
of the plaintiffs. Each plaintiff received a written document 
setting forth his or her salary and stating: 
The above is effective for the period of assignment 
only. Should the manager be separated for any reason, 
unless special arrangements are supplied in writing, the 
arrangement terminates as well. [Emphasis added]. 
Plainly, the intent of the foregoing was that regardless of the 
reason for discharge, plaintiffs' right to any future salary would 
terminate. 
There was no evidence of any financial windfall to Nordstrom 
resulting from plaintiffs' terminations. Indeed, plaintiffs' dam-
age evidence consisted entirely of evidence of lost wages and 
benefits. Therefore, there was no evidentiary foundation for any 
damage award. Accordingly, this court should reverse and vacate 
the judgment against Nordstrom. 
In the alternative, the court should grant a remittitur of 
damages to $0.00. Where, as here, an error in instructions as to 
damages is prejudicial to the defendant, and the amount by which 
the verdict was increased by the error can be clearly determined, 
a remittitur for that amount should be filed. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Damages, § 346 at 450 (1965). Here, but for the district court's 
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error in giving Instruction No. 18, plaintiffs could have been 
awarded no damages. Thus, a remittitur of damages to $0.00 is 
appropriate. 
B. Even if the District Court Correctly Fixed the Measure of 
Damages, the Amount Awarded is Unsupported by the Evi-
dence. Therefore, this Court Should Order a Remittitur 
or Grant Nordstrom a New Trial. 
Under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial may 
be granted where a jury's damage award is excessive, "appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," or 
where the evidence is insufficient to justify the award. In the 
alternative, remittitur is available where the excessive damage 
amount is "capable of definite and accurate ascertainment." 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). Assuming the 
district court's instruction concerning damages was correct, under 
this legal standard this court should order a remittitur or grant 
Nordstrom a new trial. 
Instruction No. 18, the district court's instruction concern-
ing the measure of damages, provided that such damages were equal 
to the total of the "promised and/or reasonably expected salary 
for the plaintiffs over the period of termination to the present, 
plus 'fringe benefits,'" reduced by the amounts actually earned by 
plaintiffs or the amounts plaintiffs reasonably could have been 
expected to earn in available employment comparable to their 
employment with Nordstrom. R. C-82-5282, 557. Under this 
instruction, the jury's damages award is plainly excessive and 
unsupported by the evidence. 
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Dennis Knapp introduced evidence showing his damages totaled 
$27,000 per year, representing the difference between his salary 
at the time he left Nordstrom, $56,000, and his income at the time 
of trial, $29,000. Tr. Vol. II, 9. Calculating damages at that 
rate over the 42 months from the date of Knapp's termination from 
Nordstrom through the time of trial, Knapp's damages total $94,500 
($2,250 per month x 42 months). The jury awarded $150,000. 
R. C82-5828, 538. This court should order a remittitur of the 
excessive amount. 
Barbara Knapp claimed she was entitled to damages of $14,000 
per year. Tr. Vol. Ill, 73-74. That damage amount represented 
the sum of her final Nordstrom salary, $24,000, her expected 
bonus, $2,000, and the amount she received upon termination from 
her profit sharing plan, $6,000, less her current salary, 
$18,000. Tr. Vol. Ill, 73. At the rate she claimed, her damages 
total $49,014 ($1,167 per month x 42 months). The jury awarded 
her $80,000. R. C82-5828, 538. 
Even giving Barbara Knapp the benefit of the doubt, however, 
her $14,000 per year damage claim is excessive. Her calculation 
assumed $6,000 annually in profit sharing. She testified, how-
ever, that the $6,000 she received upon termination was accumu-
lated over 5 years. Tr. Vol. Ill, 72, 80-81. Assuming she would 
continue to receive profit sharing at the same rate, $1,200 
annually (which is pure speculation, since plaintiffs introduced 
no evidence to support any assumptions concerning future profit 
sharing), her damage claim should be reduced by $400 per month. 
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Computing damages on that basis, her damages total $32,214 ($767 
per month x 42 months). This court should order a remittitur at 
least to that amount. 
Cathy Brehany computed her damages on the basis of two assump-
tions: (1) that her salary would increase 10% each year and 
(2) that she would earn 15% of her salary as profit sharing each 
year. Tr. Vol. II, 176-177. She testified her annual salary at 
the time she left Nordstrom was $28,000, and computed her pro-
jected increases from that base figure. I^d. Her actual earnings 
were set forth in her tax returns for 1981 through 1983. Ex. P-2, 
P-3 and P-4. She testified her current annual salary, which 
started in 1984, was $35,000. Tr. Vol. Ill, 30-31. 
Brehany's projected and actual earnings were as follows: 
1981 1982 1983 1984 Total 
Projected Earnings $28,000 $30,800 $33,880 $37,268 $129,948 
Actual Earnings $16,686 $25,733 $29,077 $35,000 $106,496 
Adding 15% for profit sharing to Brehany's projected salary 
over the relevant period, her projected earnings total $149,440. 
The difference between that amount and her actual earnings equals 
$42,944. Under Brehany's assumptions, that is the maximum amount 
of damages she should have received. The jury awarded $55,000. 
R. C82-5828, 538. » 
Brehany's calculations, however, are based on figures falling 
impermissibly into the realm of speculation. A damage award based 
only on speculation cannot be upheld. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 
953, 956 (Utah 1983). Brehany's assumption of 10% annual salary 
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increases is based on her raise for a single year. Tr. Vol. II, 
175. That is insufficient data to project indefinitely into the 
future. 
Moreover, Brehany admitted that her profit sharing amount 
depended on Nordstrom1s profits. Tr. Vol. Ill, 29-30. She 
offered no evidence, however, to substantiate her assumption that 
Nordstrom earned sufficient profits for her to have received 15% 
profit sharing each year, even though such figures for the damage 
years in question would have been available at the time of trial. 
Tr. Vol. II, 175-177. Again, there is no basis in evidence for 
the jury to have been entitled to consider the 15% annual profit 
sharing figure. 
The court should at least determine that Brehany's 10% annual 
salary increase assumption is speculative and cannot provide a 
basis for damages. Without such annual increases, allowing 
Brehany 15% profit sharing annually, her damages total $22,304. 
Eliminating Brehany's profit sharing assumption as well, for which 
there was also no factual basis, her damages total $5,504. 
Under the measure of damage instruction given by the court, 
allowing plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt on all their assump-
tions, their damages total $186,458 compared to the jury's award 
of $285,000. Eliminating Barbara Knapp's and Cathy Brehany's 
impermissibly speculative assumptions, plaintiffs' damages total 
$121,718. Accordingly, even if the district court's measure of 
damage instruction is affirmed, this court should order a remitti-
tur or grant Nordstrom a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this court should reverse that 
portion of the district court's judgment that is in favor of 
plaintiffs and against Nordstrom. In the alternative, the court 
should order a remittitur to $0.00, or such other amount as is 
determined by the court, or grant Nordstrom a new trial. 
DATED this / 5 & d a y 0f December, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By AAK^\ 
Max D. Wheeler 
S t e p h e n ' J . Hi l 
^J^CJ^^JS>-By 
StanleyYJV P r e s t o n 
Attorne^ar for Appe l lan t 
Nordstrom, I n c . 
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ADDENDUM 
1. District Court's Oral Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict 
2. Special Verdict 
3. Judgment 
4. Order Denying Nordstrom's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur 
5. Amended Notice of Appeal 
6. Nordstrom's Requested Jury Instruction Nos. 34, 35, 64, 66 
7. Jury Instruction No. 18 
8. Memorandum Decision and Order, Heward v. Western Electric Co., 
Case No. C81-0904W (D. Utah, filed February 18, 1983) 
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own income on how many sales took place in that store. 
Their pecuniary interests were every bit as keen 
as were those of Jim Nordstrom1s in terms of the financial 
consequences. Because their own salaries, their own profit 
sharing, everything was dependent upon the success of 
Nordstroms, the profit, the sales, and that is the reason 
why Nordstroms would not tolerate this type of thing in 
Utah, because the adverse publicity that could result from 
that could damage the sales and the profit of the company. 
So even if you want to restrict the conditional 
privilege to a pecuniary interest, we have met the burden. 
But I submit that there are no cases that hold that that is 
the restriction. Indeed, if you read the Utah cases we have 
cited, that is certainly not the case. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That concludes the arguments, then, as 
to this motion made by Mr. Wheeler for a directed verdict 
against the plaintiffs on the ground and for the reason they 
have failed to make out a case on which they can recover and 
go to the jury. 
The court's labored through this with all of 
you for — what is this, the eighth day? — eight days of 
jury trial. At intermittent times when I have had occasion 
to read the cases submitted by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Athay 
and Mr. Wheeler, and after having done all that, I have 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 reached a decision. 
2 My decision is this. First of all# I do not 
3 believe that there is any defamation in this case. I think 
4 the commonality of interest between Mr. Nordstrom and his 
5 managers, that is all the other managers, as such, that there] 
6 is a privilege which is protected. Were this not so, a 
7 manager would be unable to deal with his subordinates or an 
8 owner deal with his managers in cases of this kind, thus 
9 stopping the progress of ordinary management-employee 
10 relationships in business. 
11 Second, I believe that there is no contract 
12 as a contract is understood by people who write them, being 
13 implied specifically, as shown in the Bihlmaier case, 
14 I I am somewhat troubled by the citing of a case 
15 that1s determined by a motion for summary judgment, as was 
16 Bihlmaier, on an issue that has to do with evidence that in 
17 the opinion of the plaintiffs ought to be submitted to the 
18 jury for specific rulings on special situations, and I 
19 think Z agree with Mr. Robinson, the Bihlmaier case is 
20 distinguishable. 
21 Not only that, the employee quit because the 
22 employer wouldn't correct a statement to the lender which 
23 would allow him to borrow money. Maybe the wrong defendant 
24 was in that action, it should have been the bank for not 
25 lending the money. 
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But in any event, aside from that# I don't think 
there1 s that kind of a contract, but Z do think that the 
plaintiffs in this case have the kind of thing that was 
written about by our founding fathers in 1774 and '75, when 
Madison clearly recognized the right and property and property 
and right. In this court1s judgment there is a right of 
good faith dealing which is protected in the courts. 
I realize this may be stepping into a new era. 
I don't see the case quota, at length written by former 
Justice Oakes in this area, as necessarily giving much 
light on this specific issue because of its difference 
from any of the tort cases that we have talked about, the 
school case, or others having this kind of a right specific-
ally. But I believe that this is a right which is protect-
able, and that if this jury finds that the defendants herein, 
Mr. Nordstrom is the agent and authorized officer of 
Nordstroms, and in that capacity terminated the employees, 
violating that implied contract of good faith dealing, 
plaintiffs can recover. 
That means that the issue of lost wages is not 
an issue. Compensation to the plaintiffs, if any is deter-
mined by this jury, must be based on damages they suffered 
as a result of the failure on the part of Nordstrom as found 
by the jury to act in good faith in dealing with their 
management employees, a superior management employee, as 
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everyone has said, but for this one thing, Mr. Knapp and 
other employees involved in this as plaintiffs, Mrs. Knapp 
and Miss Brehaney. 
It may be a new furrow is being drawn, but X have 
had occasion to think about this, read some of the old 
federal papers, analyzed the kind of things we thought were 
important in this country as contract and tort law has grown. 
I think Judge Pishler was right in excluding 
torts. I think I am absolutely correct in excluding defama-
tion and limiting this lawsuit to implied contract of good 
faith dealing, which is employees who do their job expect 
to receive from their employer. 
I think a lot of red herrings have been drawn 
across the jury's path by talking about termination for 
wearing the wrong colored dress. I don't think there's any 
evidence in this case by any of the people who have testifiedf 
that the employer who spends a lot of money training employ-
ees would ever do that, would be that irresponsible. But if 
he did, of course, that would really be an evidence of what 
I am talking about, and I think that could limit you. To getj 
into that area in argument before the jury might be a basis 
for declaring a mistrial. I think that is spurious, and I 
am not telling you exactly how to argue, and I won't consider] 
that. 
I think if you argue to the jury that an 
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1 employer can terminate anybody for wearing the wrong color 
2 of tie, that's not the kind of blackening I am talking 
3 about. But if you talk about the evidence that's before 
4 this court that the jury may look at, that there wasn't 
5 suffic^nt investigation, there wasn't sufficient work done 
6 by Mi. Nordstrom to do just what he did, or there is some 
7 other way he could have treated these people and he didn't 
8 do it, that is a lack of good faith dealing for his 
9 employees, and for that reason they are entitled to be 
10 compensated, that is an argument that I think is permissible. 
11 But going beyond that, I think, is not. 
12 As I have circumscribed this case not only as to 
13 its narrow area of being dealth with, which is a new area 
14 in the law in this day, but also I am circumscribing the 
15 kind of argument I am going to allow you to make to the jury. 
16 And that may be a bad faith dealing right there by the court. 
17 But that's where I am going on the record on tort law. 
18 Now, if you want to look over your instructions 
19 and see if we can fashion some instructions to this jury 
20 that will allow you to get at that issue, does anybody have 
21 any quest ions? 
22 Do you have any questions about this, Mr. Wheelerj? 
23 It was your motion. £ny question about what I said? Do you 
24 understand what I said? 
25 MR. WHEELER: I think so, Your Honor, except with 
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respect to the damages. You say that lost wages could not 
be the basis. 
THE COURT: That's true. 
MR. WHEELER: As far as I know, that's the only 
evidence of damages before the jury. 
THE COURT: Well# the damages that they plead, as I 
read their complaints, indicate whatever damages are mete and 
just under circumstances in the old law, but it's fair to 
consider the damage to these people, if any, as a result of 
that bad faith dealing, if any, which Mr. Nordstrom had 
perfectly no ground, it wasnft bad faith to walk in and 
terminate them forthwith. If the jury thinks that's okay, 
that's okay. If they think there are some bad faith dealings 
then, they can award what they think that's worth in terms 
of whatever it's going to amount to as far as Nordstrom is 
concerned, they can go that direction. That's the damages. 
It's much like a general damage question in 
another tort case. I don't know how you get at the numbers. 
Certainly, Mr. Knapp can say that it took him 
a long time to get employment. But that's all defamation. 
You can't get into that. His bad dealing is what we are 
talking about. And I circumscribed the argument to the jury 
to get into that area. So we are not going to get into 
these areas. 
I may not retry this case, but I will certainly 
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1 do it if we get outside the boundary I have set. 
2 MR. WHEELERt As I understand, you are dismissing the 
3 defamation claim, but you are allowing the issue to go to the 
4 jury on whether the Nordstroms acted in good faith in termi-
5 nating these people. 
6 THE COURT: Yes. And I am saying that the agreement 
7 which is signed by the employee that's Exhibit No. 1 indi-
8 cates there will be a good faith, it creates a good faith 
9 dealing right which is protectable by the courts and of the 
io I kind of property in a right, and that's the property to be 
11 I protected which is allowed under these circumstances. 
12 MR. WHEELER: I think I understand what you are saying, 
13 
15 
Your Honor. It may require a little modification of our 
14 instructions. I don't think — 
THE COURT: Well, there may be, and I am willing to 
16 I work with you on any basis; earlier, later. They are not 
17 coming in till 9:00. That's not going to give you a lot of 
18 instructions, now. We are narrowing the case down consider-
19 ably. 
20 MR. WHEELER: It is going to be short. 
21 THE COURT: So you are not going to have to give them 
22 40 instructions. I wouldn't give them that, anyway. 
23 As a matter of fact, many years ago I was 
24 involved in a case where they gave him 60 instructions. 
25 They should have had the judge whipped for giving him so 
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1
 many. 
2 Now, the next question on the record, I want 
3 to a*k you, Mr. Robinson, do you understand what I said? 
4
 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Athay? 
6 MR. ATHAY: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: You can have all the time you want. 
8 MR. ROBINSON: About 30 minutes before we approach 
9 the court in chambers for instructions? 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. ROBINSON: You need to get them typed. 
12 THE COURT: Do you want to look over your instructions 
13 and see what you can get? 
14 All right. Do that. When you get ready, we 
15 will work with you on any basis. 
16 This is mostly going to be law work. I would 
17 suggest, unless the Knapps have some real interest in stay-
18
 ing in this courtroom, as beautiful «is it is, for two or 
19
 three hours, and Miss Brehaney and their witness and so on, 
20 i don't know if you want to stick around. We will just be 
21 doing paperwork. 
22 MR. ROBINSON: With the court1s permission, we will 
23 take a ten minute coffee break and get busy and knock on yourj 
24 door as soon as we can. 
25 THE COURT: I am not going anyplace. As I indicated 
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before on the record, I am a public servant. 
(At 3:10 p.m. a recess was taken 
to 10:30 a.m. the following day.) 
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 By K^mMuy 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ V Deputy Clerk 
SPECIAL VERDICT Q^fe ^ C%2J2%)22> 
We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the evidence 
in this case the following answers to the questions propounded 
to us: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Have plaintiffs proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant Nordstrom, Inc. acted in bad 
faith in terminating their employment? 
As to plaintiff Dennis Knapp, answer yes or no tXl&J . 
As to plaintiff Barbara Knapp, answer yes or no L/jL&J . 
As to plaintiff Cathy Brehany, answer yes or no ^ j y / . 
If you answered question no. 1 "yes" as to any plaintiff, 
then answer question no. 2 as to that plaintiff only. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the bad faith act by defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc., cause damage to any plaintiff? 
As to plaintiff Dennis Knapp, answer yes or no ij^^ • 
As to plaintiff Barbara Knapp, answer yes or no LLfoJ . 
As to plaintiff Cathy Brehany, answer yes or no //g^/ . 
If you answered question no. 2 "yes," as to any plaintiff, 
then answer question no. 3 as to that plaintiff only. 
QUESTION NO. 3: What amount would reasonably compensate 
plaintiff for any damage he or she suffered as a result of 
the bad faith act of defendant Nordstrom, Inc.? 
P l a i n t i f f Dennis Knapp: IfSD. OOO-OO 
P l a i n t i f f Barbara Knapp: * %£) » DDO-OD 
Plaintiff Cathy Brehany: ** ^5^,000- OQ ^38 
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David K. Robinson of and for V \ o' 
DAVID K. ROBINSON, P.C. 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
770 E South Temple 
Sal t Lake City , Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 355-3777 
Utah State Bar #2780 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CATHY BREHANY, AND DENNIS ] 
KNAPP, et a l . , } 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
• » . 
NORDSTROM, INC. , e t a l . ] 
D e f e n d a n t s . ] 
) JUDGMENT 
! J&J. /96> A/O, 
\ I *5- /S~ — 
1 C i v i l No. C82-5860 
) C82-5828 
> JUDGE DEE 
T h e s e a c t i o n s , having been previously consol idated, came on for 
t r i a l b e f o r e t h e Cour t and a J u r y , The H o n o r a b l e David B. Dee 
p r e s i d i n g . The i s s u e s hav ing been duly t r i ed and the Court having 
d i s m i s s e d P l a i n t i f f s ' claims for defamation and wrongful termination 
on D e f e n d a n t s ' Motion for Directed Verdict , and the jury having duly 
rendered i t s verdict by Special Verdict on the i s sues submitted to i t , 
w h e t h e r D e f e n d a n t Nordstrom, Inc. acted in bad f a i t h in terminating 
P l a i n t i f f s 9 employment , and whether, and to what ex tent , P l a i n t i f f s 
suffered damages as a r e s u l t , 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. That P l a i n t i f f s take nothing on any of t h e i r claims against 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l D e f e n d a n t s and that a l l of the i r claims against the 
individual Defendants be dismissed; 
2. That P l a i n t i f f s take nothing on t h e i r claims for defamation 
and w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n against Defendant Nordstrom, Inc. and that 
' - - — V : - 2 6 7 7 
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those claims be dismissed; 
3 . That P l a i n t i f f , D e n n i s Knapp, recover of the Defendant, 
N o r d s t r o m , I n c . , t h e sum o f One Hundred F i f t y Thousand Dollars 
( $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , w i t h i n t e r e s t thereon at the rate of Twelve percent 
( 1 2 Z ) p e r annum a s p r o v i d e d by l a w , and h is cos t s of ac t ion , as 
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e Court on h i s claim that Defendant Nordstrom, Inc. 
breached an implied covenant of good f a i t h ; 
4 . That P l a i n t i f f B a r b a r a Knapp, recover of the Defendant, 
Nordstrom, I n c . , the sum of Eighty Thousand Dol lars ($80 ,000 .00) , with 
i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n , a t t h e rate of Twelve percent (12Z) per annum as 
p r o v i d e d by l a w , and her cos t s of ac t ion , as determined by the Court 
on h e r c l a i m t h a t D e f e n d a n t N o r d s t r o m , Inc . breached an implied 
covenant of good f a i t h ; and 
5. That P l a i n t i f f , Cathy Brehany, recover the sum of F i f t y Five 
Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , with i n t e r e s t thereon at the rate of 
T w e l v e p e r c e n t ( 1 2 Z ) per annum as provided by law, and her c o s t s of 
a c t i o n a s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e Cour t on h e r c l a i m t h a t Defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc. breached an implied covenant of good f a i t h . 
DATED t h i s < ^ / day of February, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as toyform: 
DATED this t'Y day of February, 1985. (fieto)iiL> 
A:, ,J/r- I 'I 1 
David K. Robinson 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brehany Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Approved as to form: 
DATED this / ^ day of February, 1985. 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Knapp 
Approved as to form: 
DATED this^Zo day of February, 1985. 
^ 
Steven O. Hill V 
Attorney for Defendant Nordstrom, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed the original to the Clerk of the 
District Court for Salt Lake County, at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, and a true and correct copy to the persons at the 
address shown below on this /V^ day of February, 1985. 
/fluu €berf~ 
Stephen J. Hill, Esq. 
and Max D. Wheeler, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
D. Gilbert Athay, Esq. 
72 E 400 S #325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CATHY BREHANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORDSTROM, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA 
KNAPP, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NORDSTROM, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for hearing on the Motion of 
defendant Nordstrom, Inc. for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur on March 15, 1985. 
The Court having considered the oral argument of counsel, 
the memorandum submitted by defendant in favor of its 
motions, the files and records herein, and being fully 
advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc. for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
New Trial or Remittitur is denied. 
ORDER 
Civil Nos. C82-5828 
C82-5860 
(Judge Dee) 
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DATED this f^L day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
£k&A ; ^ g -District Judge A X J p S T 
H.D'^C^H'FN'DL^Y 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 0 
Stephen J. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc. 
ATHAY AND ASSOCIATES 
fT Gilbert Athay 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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MAX D . WHEELER 
STEPHEN J. HILL 
STANLEY J. PRESTON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Nordstrom 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CATHY BREHANY, 
Plaintiff, 
AMENDED NOTICE 
vs. OF APPEAL 
NORDSTROM, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA 
KNAPP, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. Civil Nos. C82-5860 
C82-5828 
NORDSTROM, INC., et al., (Judge Dee) 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
defendant Nordstrom, Inc. ("Nordstrom") hereby gives 
notice of appeal. Nordstrom appeals from that portion 
of the Judgment of this Court entered on February 21, 1985, 
A 
-|U -* \ 
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which is in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc., including but not limited to that portion 
of the judgment which awards damages and costs to plain-
tiffs against defendant Nordstrom, Inc. Nordstrom also 
appeals from the Court's order entered on September 12, 
1985, denying Nordstrom1s Motions for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict or, in the Alternative, New Trial or 
Remittitur. This appeal is taken from the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, and is taken to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ^L^^ /-Mi 
Max D'. Wheeler 
Stephen J. Hill 
Stanley J. Preston 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Nancy Hughes, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for defendant Nordstrom, Inc. 
herein; that she served the attached Amended Notice 
pf Appeal 
C82-5860 
(Case Number C82-5828 , Salt Lake County) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and 
correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Athay and Associates 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, on the 17th day of September , 1985. 
ftamAu tkqhajb 
N a n c y H u g i e s Q 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 17 th day of 
fippfpmhgr , 1 9 8 5 . 
Ckt/ iJfrfa^n 
Notary/Public 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I1/ 
The policy manual of defendant Nordstrom, Inc., entitled 
•Nordstrom History, Policy & Regulations,11 does not give rise 
to a binding employment contract between defendant Nordstrom, 
Inc., and plaintiffs. Dnelss you find there was an express or 
implied agreement between defendant Nordstrom, Inc., and each 
of the plaintiffs as to a definite term of employment, defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc., was entitled to terminate plaintiffs' employment 
at any time for any reason. If you do find such an agreement 
for a definite term of employment, defendant Nordstrom, Inc., 
could terminate plaintiffs' employment for the reasons listed 
in its policy manual and also for other reasons not listed in 
the manual, provided there was good cause for the terminations. 
Gates y. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); 
Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 
1982); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980); 
Johnson v. National Beef PackinlpCo., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); 
Bihlmeir v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Shaw v. S. S. 
Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1975). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
In justifying its dismissal of plaintiffs, defendant 
Nordstrom, Inc., can rely on grounds for dismissal other than 
those stated at the time of the terminations, even though 
defendant Nordstrom, Inc., was unaware of those grounds at 
the time of the terminations, so long as those grounds 
existed at the time plaintiffs were discharged. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th 
Cir. 1954); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 189 Or. 339, 219 P.2d 
163 (1950); 53 Am. Jur. 2d, "Master and Servant," § 46 at 120-
121; Restatement, Second, Contracts, S 237, Illustration 8, at 
p. 219. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. ^" 
l,H.>'ii "i • "jrdstrom, Inc., acted in good faith in 
terminating plaintiffs' employment if it acted on 
belief, even if mistaken tiffs' discharge was 
regu legitimate business interests. 
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 
(1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d. 311, 171 
Cal. Rptr. 937 (1981). 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO . 18 
measure of damages for ' i a ease •uck -s 
this 
"
u
~ iromised and/or reasonably expected salary * 
p l a i n t i f f s over the tie present, of the 
"i they were entit led to as employees of 
Nordstrom, including, biit: not necessarily limited t 
bonus payaen plans, health insruance and accident 
insurance. 
This amount reduced by tho 'v earned by 
tn amounts plaint i f fs could have reasonably been 
e x p e c t e c other available employment with an empoloye 
comparable s i z e repu? the reta i l fashion 
ordstrom, Inc. 
ff are not to be penalized if , using < gen • • ney 
were unabl# emj^ &Lyer of comparable s ize , 
r e p u t a t i o n c l i e n t e l e as Nordstrom, Inc. , for in that case, such 
employment is not available. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
N. ENOS HEWARD, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, AND ORDER 
-vs-
Civil No: C-81-0904W 
WESTFPN ELECTPIC COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED, 
Defendant, 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judqment and 
defendant's motion for summary judgment were orally arqued on 
February 1, 1983. Plaintiff was represented by Lynn P. Feward 
and defendant was represented by Chris Wanasqard. Plaintiff's 
motion, seeking a ruling that the provisions of 29 U.S.C, 
5 626(d) requirinq exhaustion of state and administrative 
remedies have been met, and that the age discrimination issue is 
ripe for determination, was acknowledqed by the defendant and 
granted. Defendant's motion for summary judqment was taken under 
advisement. The court has since reviewed the memoranda of 
counsel and pertinent cited authorities. Based on the foreaoina 
the court renders the followinq decision. 
The primary question for resolution in this case is 
whether the plaintiff was dismissed from the defendant's employ 
because of his aqe in violation of the Aqe Discrimination 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. $S 621 et seq. That Act provides that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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C-81-0904W 
•It shall be unlawful for an employ* . . . 
individual because - individual's age, 29 U.S.C. 
S 623(a)i ntends plaintiff hasn't met its 
burden of presenting a prima facie case - r u n the plaint, i! i a 
def i I'linri ill lllhii i' ! Ji| I: he i r arquments using the four-part 
analysis of McDonnell Douglas corp« v, Green» 
(1973), though such an extensive showinq f not necessary for an 
ADF A ca s e • S e e McCuen \ . Home
 m Insurance Company, 633 F • 2d 1150 
(5th Cir, 1981) (even if a plaintiff cannot make - McDonnell 
Douqlas type showing, he nay still recover if he can show he was 
discharged foeca Indeed, the McDonnell test "was 
never intended to be the onl mid fatie t^M for disci i imi^ i -* 
r * otherwise McCorstin v, nnited States Steel Corp., 
621 F.2d 749 (5th rehearing denied „ f ;• 7 F 2d 239 
accord, Stanoiev v« Fbasco Services, Inc.f 643 F.2d 914 (2ne 
1981) ; Loeb v. Texti ,M • 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 'un.ia 
facie case flexible standard that may differ according to 
d i fIri i " 1111 4 - - See also 
Furnco Construction Corp, v» Waters, 
A plaintiff suing for wronqful dismissal under ADEA has 
a prima faci that but for I he plaintiff's 
age the plaintiff would not .have been terminated. Mortensei » t .' 
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C-81-0904W 
Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 823 (10th Cir. 1982)? Bentley v, 
Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1981)j Smith v. 
University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980); 
Smithers v. Railar, 629 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1980)? Cleverly v. 
Western Electric Company, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Miss. 
1978); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 
(F.D. Mich. 1976). 
After carefully reviewinq the record the court is of 
the opinion a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Specifically, circumstantial evidence raises a question of fact 
whether plaintiff was treated differently than vounqer employees 
were beina treated and whether plaintiff was subsequently 
dismissed because of his aae. Summary judqment, therefore, is 
not appropriate and the matter should be submitted to the jury. 
Several questions of law remain to be decided, thouqh, 
one of which is whether the implied contractual obliqations 
alleaed in plaintiff's second and third causes of action are 
leqally coanizable under Utah law. Plaintiff•essentially 
contends the defendant in failinq to afford the plaintiff the 
process reouired to dismiss him breached an implied covenant of 
qood faith and fair dealinq. After a review of the cases cited 
by both plaintiff and defendant, the court must conclude Utah law 
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does not recognize plaintiff's implied contract claimf ltcially 
actionab where the plaintiff's employment contract 
is indefinite as to duration 
Other leqal Questions which remain, as discussed the 
February concern various remedies The 
Questions reqarding liquidated damages and at, I i i i \. l^tf: i 
I reserved pendinq the outcome of the trial Whether 
punitive damaaes are recovei ^termined now a? it 
'could affect counsels1 presentation ! evidence at tiial « »'h 
i * I i i I designed afford broad relief, the court 
"'is also aware the courts are s; " " | > rive damaqes 
t i be awarded foi violation • Discrimination 
Employment A i weiqht authority and reasc 
however, would foreclose of punit 
the potential under the Act for ? x . icruidated 
damages, which penalty seems 
inconaruous to also allow an award of punitive damages. Pee 
hi |>| pwpnt to 24 808 5
 T '"Construction 
Application Employment Art of 1967. 
Accordingly, IP HEPERY ORDFPFI flefenda* 
II summary judgment is qranted plaintifffs second 
third causes plaintiffs first 
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C-81-0904W 
cause of action. The question of whether defendant's actions in 
terminating the plaintiff violated the Age Discrimination 
Employment Act is reserved for a jury's determination. 
Dated this day of Pebruaryf 19B3. 
\k'<tJh<({':'v<(1('-\ 
David K. Vinaer" 
United States District Judae 
Mailed a copy of the foreqoinq Memorandum Decision and 
Order to the following named counsel this '{ day of February, 
1983. 
Lynn P. Heward, ESQ. 
1174 East 2700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Chris Wanqsqard, Fso. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
- w / fcix -^^<y 
Secretary u 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that T caused four true and correct copies 
K \e foregoing Brief rf Appellant to be served by first cla 
* i , mi Deeembi? i: I t l le f ::>] I ow i IM| : 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 1 
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